IRAQ AND THE ARAB SPRING by Jabar, Faleh A.
105
I-Tentative Assumptions:
I begin with two controversial assumptions:
One: Unlike what most Iraqi scholars believe, post 2003 
change of regime in Iraq did not inspire the democratic upheaval 
known as “the Arab Spring”; in fact it delayed it. Iraq’s turmoil 
was used by despots across the Arab world as a showcase of 
how Western-imposed democracy is dripped in sectarian blood.
Two: Contrary to the widely accepted notion, the Arab Spring 
did not begin in Tunisia (December 2010) rather in Iran right 
after the June 2009, widely believed to have been doctored to 
ensure a second term of the Iranian president Ahmadinajad. 
Iran is rich with grass-root civil dissidence, one that toppled 
the Shah regime by civil action rather than military coup. Arab 
countries, by contrast, have been bereft of such civil potency, 
until the series of mass, urban action that erupted in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria.
If this assumption has some truth, the movement will 
boomerang to Iran in the foreseeable future. The success of 
the Spring Movements is yet to be completed. Syria is still in a 
stalemate; whereas Iran is seemingly stable.Faleh A. Jabar*
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II-Political Differentials and Common 
Reference:
 A meaningful analysis of the case, Iraq 
and the Arab Spring, should begin with a 
necessary differentiation of Arab polities:
1- The Sultanistic type (e.g. Saudi Arab), 
despotic polities embedded in religion and 
tradition; 2- the authoritarian-totalitarian type 
(Syria, Libya, etc), of centralized polities of 
party-state, total hegemonic structures; and, 
3- the semi-reformed authoritarian group 
(Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, among others such 
as Jordan, Morocco), where a measure of 
political tolerance, and a measure of ‘free-
market’ spaces, have established, allowing for 
niches of civil organization and action. 
Protest movements erupted in the 
third, reformed group, and spread, even 
prematurely, to both Sultanistic and totalitarian 
/authoritarian polities. This differential has far 
reaching historical significance that can further 
be explored and debated. 
 The spill-over is, to a great extent, 
reminiscent of the chain reaction that engulfed 
Eastern Europe ‘socialist regime’, or Latin 
American military regimes, in the 1990s. 
Each region had a common framework, and 
common reference points.   
Iraq has far surpassed other Arab countries 
in the deconstruction of the old totalitarian 
system, but it still retains hyper-centralized 
features, and has been moving towards more 
authoritarian mode of governance, a fact that 
invited cross ethno-communal challenges. 
III-Iraq’s Dilemma:
Generally, Iraq is in limbo, an indeterminate 
state of things that tortures hopeful and fearful 
leading politicians. For them, the full impact of 
the Arab spring is yet to come, as the Syrian 
stalemate continues, and the Iranian protest is 
still dormant.
What the Arab civil protest movements 
have thus far achieved is to dismantle the 
Egyptian Model, a totalitarian/authoritarian 
military regime, with or without the single 
party (the old al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki, or the new 
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Watani party) that hegemonized the nation 
by a de facto single party-single family rule, 
which installed crony capitalism under Sadat-
Mubarak that made a mockery of market-
embedded liberal democracy. 
Needless to say, this model prevailed 
since 1952 in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Sudan and 
Algeria. But now, the tyranny of high brass is 
over (Turkey achieved the same result via an 
electoral, democratic process.)
Now, according to our assumption, if the 
movement boomeranged to its presumable 
origin, Iran, this would, if successful, lead to 
the downfall of the second model that also 
spread in the region, the Khomeni type of 
clerical totalitarianism, an outcome that will 
bring down with it, or weaken, an array of 
socio-political and ideological offshoots in 
Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, and even 
Palestine (West bank and Gaza).
The analysis of the first leg (the Arab 
countries) is one of factual examination of 
existing reality, the analysis of the second 
leg, Iran, is hypothetical examination of what 
is yet-to-come development. The reason why 
we take both these legs side by side is the fact 
that Iraqi leaders build their calculations upon 
these two factual and hypothetical scenarios. 
If, in politics as in other areas, conceptions 
of actors are more important than ‘facts’ 
obtaining on the ground, these conceptions 
are in themselves facts, i.e. factors to be 
examined.
IV-Changing Polarization, Changing 
Fears and Hopes:
Iraq’s democratization from above under 
US-led occupational authority, led to the rise 
of identity politics, whose Islamic character 
was conducive to deep sectarian divide. As 
demography, in the case of identity politics, 
works as democracy, empowerment of Shi’i 
Islamic groups in Iraq was ill-tuned with the 
established polarization in the region, that 
divided its regimes into radical anti-US (Iran 
and Syria), and moderate pro-US regimes 
(Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, etc.). In fact, 
the rise of Shi’i Islamism in Iraq disrupted 
that old polarization (in place since at least 
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1970), and triggered a shift towards sectarian 
regional confrontation; this shift was further 
deeply enhanced by the electoral successes 
of Islamists in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, 
while the Syrian militarized and growing 
Islamized rebellion added more weight to this 
polarization.
Iraq’s fears and hopes vis-à-vis the Arab 
world, before, during and after the Arab 
spring, can well be thoroughly examined by 
scrutinizing its conflicting policy towards Syria. 
  During the phase of civil war in Iraq, 
20058-, Iraqi Shi’i Islamic politicians loathed 
Syrian (and other Arab countries, notably 
Saudi Arabia) political and logistical support 
for armed fundamentalists (al-Qaida groups), 
they even appealed to the UN Security 
Council; only to stop short by dint of Turkish 
mediatory efforts. Oppositional Sunni leaders, 
notable the deposed Ba’th, Syria (in addition 
to other ‘Sunni’ Arab states) was a haven and 
a patron. Kurds were largely neutral. 
Once Syria was engulfed in turmoil, and 
once the growing Islamic character of the new 
elected governments became clear, positions 
changed.
A sense of Sunni encirclement developed 
among Shi’i leaders, who began to rethink their 
tactics and strategy: more rapprochement with 
Iran, mediatory efforts between opposition and 
the regime of Bashar al-Asad, while allowing 
Iran a corridor to transport armaments to Syria, 
or let Iran commission Iraqi fighters (from 
‘Asa’ib al-Haqq, Leagues of the Righteous, 
a splinter group from the Sadr faction).  In 
addition, Iraq extended loans to Syria on the 
grounds that sanction would hurt people not 
governments. The fall of Syria is, in their eyes, 
a threat to national security, i.e. the security of 
the current government. They never showed 
any sign of welcoming the Arab spring; the 
only support voiced for them was confined to 
Bahrain, where a Shi’i majority exists.
Should Assad fall, Iran would seek more 
compensation in Iraq, and Iraq’s Shi’i leaders, 
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would seek the warmth of security in Teheran.
By contrast, Sunni politicians, of all 
ideological shades, welcomed the Syrian 
rebellion, on democratic or Islamic-sectarian 
terms. The Sunni provinces adjacent to 
Syria (Anbar, and Mosul), welcomed Syrian 
refugees, inclusive of reportedly wounded 
Free Syrian Army combatants. The civil protest 
movement in these and other provinces is 
largely emulating their Arab counterparts, 
in the hope to end what they conceive of as 
marginalization by what they term as’ Shi’i 
tyrannical regime’.
The third element in Iraq’s policies towards 
Syria is the Kurds. This is obviously because 
a Kurdish element exists in Syria. Political 
and logistical support is extensively extended 
by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), 
in an attempt to secure a foothold for the 
Kurds in the rebellion, and create facts on 
the ground for the future when a new political 
is reconstructed to allow for some version of 
Kurdish autonomy in Syria.
Iraq then is pursuing three different, 
conflicting policies; its major hopeful or fearful 
concern is a colossal Sunni encirclement or 
help, whereas some fears or hopes of renewed 
Iranian upheaval ala 1979 or 2009 also haunt 
or relieve their thoughts.
The fall of Assad will undoubtedly bring 
Iraq closer to Iran, and exacerbate the drive 
to hyper-centralization in Iraq, much to the 
marginalization of a broad array of Kurdish, 
Sunni and even Shi’i forces. This trajectory 
would hardly be reversible so long as Iran’s 
opposition remains silent.
Should Assad fall, Iran would seek more 
compensation in Iraq, and Iraq’s Shi’i 
leaders, would seek the warmth of 
security in Teheran
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